

Update on Market Simulation Group Modeling

Emissions Market Assessment Committee
Meeting
November 14, 2013

Road Map for Analysis

- Step 1: Calculate probabilities of price outcomes assuming competitive allowance market
 - POWER conference paper
 - Updates to that paper
- Step 2: Evaluate profitability of allowance withholding strategies
 - Given probabilities in step 1
 - Under different assumptions of holding limits
 - Under different assumptions of containment price?


Forecasting and Climate Policy

- An obviously important input to policy is the likely level of future emissions
- Two dominant approaches
 - Large scale simulation models (“bottom-up”) estimates based upon assumed scenarios. (e.g. Energy 2020)
 - CGE models utilizing Input-output tables with varying specificity of different sectors. (e.g. BEAR)
 - Both are calibrated to “in sample” – sometimes a single year – observations
- Both tend to produce single “point” estimates of values – or ranges of estimates based upon specific scenarios
 - Not reflective of the full distribution of values
- In many cases information about the distribution is more important than the point estimate
 - For example if objective is to minimize losses


Our General Approach

- Estimate probability model for future business-as-usual (BAU) emissions
 - BAU is “demand” for allowances
 - Price responsive abatement adds slope to BAU demand curve
- Consider scenarios of complimentary measure impacts
 - Measures that are *not* directly responsive to allowance prices
- Combine these to forecast distribution of future allowance prices
 - Probability of prices at floor
 - Probability of prices in allowance reserve
 - Probability at price above allowance reserve

Figure 1 Supply of Allowances




Prob. Density of BAU Emissions



Note: Illustrative example only, not real data!

Figure 3 Supply and Demand



Factors in BAU modeling

- Macroeconomic growth and fluctuations
 - Real GSP, VMT, electricity demand
- Energy intensity trends and fluctuations
 - Transport CO₂/VMT; Power CO₂/MWh
- Supply shocks:
 - hydro-electricity, gasoline prices
- Complimentary policies
 - SB1368, LCFS, RPS, CAFE, Fed Policies/Incentives


Details vs. Forecast Accuracy

- Modeling tendency is to include many variables
 - Biofuels production, number of toasters sold, etc.
- In econometric models this can improve “in sample” fit but increase the variance of the forecast
 - (e.g. If an underlying, unimportant variable is noisy)
- When focus is on variance of forecast (e.g. of BAU emissions) there is a cost to adding too many explanatory variables
 - Can overstate the range of uncertainty
- More variables (e.g. intensities) does allow for forecasts to be limited to “feasible” paths.

Assumptions on Timing

- Main analysis assumes years/phases fully integrated over time through banking
- Aggregate emissions, complimentary measures, and abatement over 8 years
- All calculations based upon 8 year totals
- Implication is that we are evaluating “end of program” price probabilities
- At any time before EOP, prices should reflect weighted expectations of EOP prices.

Trajectories of Allowance Prices: Assuming a limited containment reserve



Possible Trajectories of Allowance Prices: Assuming a firm containment price





Figure 5

Allowance Price Probabilities by Scenario




■ pr(floor)
 ■ pr(upslope)
 ■ pr(inreserve)
 ■ pr(abovereserve)

Changes to March Report

- Update to include 2012 data where available
 - Economy (GSP) grew faster than anticipated
 - Increases median forecast, reduces range of forecast
- Account for retirement of SONGS
- New method for modeling complimentary policies
 - Explicitly account for trends as part of compliance
 - Avoids “double counting” effect of comp. policies
- More detailed decomposition of price-responses
 - Examine implications of natural gas allocations

Comp. Policies Skew Probabilities of Emissions



Note: Illustrative example only, not real data!

Schedule

- Updated “competitive” market forecasts by end of year
- Evaluation of manipulation strategies by March 2014