Comment Log Display

November 15, 2021

Liane M. Randolph
Chair, California Air Resources Board
1001 I Street
P.O. Box 2815
Sacramento, CA 95812

SUBJECT: Comments Regarding the Proposed Amendments to the
Commercial
Harbor Craft Regulation

Dear Chair Randolph,

The various Civil Engineering and Transportation firms, operating
within California's maritime sector, take immense pride in our
aggressive pursuit of fleet innovation, while actively integrating
Best Management Practices within our current business operations.
Commercial Harbor Craft (CHC) operations are paramount to our
industry's ability to dredge channels and maintain ports that are
crucial to American trade. Additionally, long haul barge transport
operations provide grossly overlooked benefits to the general
public by connecting commodities to distant markets, without
congesting California's already strained freeway system. 

CHC operators understand the importance of taking meaningful steps
towards reducing harmful Particulate Matter (PM) and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions (GHG) such as SOx, NOx, and CO2 within our areas of
operation. In our efforts to meet upcoming CHC regulations, we have
dedicated resources towards researching and implementing new
technologies within our fleets. However, the newly proposed CHC
amendment promulgates an impractical expansion of existing CHC
regulations. This amendment will now include engine upgrade
requirements to be met within a timeframe that is simply not
feasible for Subchapter M operators. Concerns regarding these
additional regulations have arisen based upon valid observations of
blatant discrepancies littered throughout the new amendment
proposal process. These include, but are not limited to the
following:

1)	The exclusion of certain commercial fishing vessels from these
CHC amendments. This exclusion is based upon factors which are
every bit as prevalent for tug and barge operators. If negative
financial impacts to industry sectors were being considered during
the development of this amendment then surely Subchapter M
operators, whose primary functions involve clamshell dredges and
barges (assets which will also be impacted), should be considered
for exemption as well. 

2)	Discrepancies, and misrepresentations, of inventory numbers and
regional data are also clear. The initial use of the USCG registry
to determine CHC vessel numbers was based upon a fundamental
misunderstanding of "Hailing Port State". However, it does not end
there. The July 7th release of the Standardized Regional Impact
Assessment (SRIA) on the proposed amendments to the existing CHC
regulation has a rather egregious omission of regional CERP data
that should be addressed. The South Coast Air Quality Management
District's (SCAQMD) Community Emissions Reduction Plan (CERP) is a
locally developed emission reduction strategy, for disadvantaged
portside communities, based upon locally generated emissions
reporting. The July 7th SIRA explicitly states:

"Emissions generated from CHC are one of the primary areas of
concern in a number of portside communities currently developing
CERPs due to their substantial toxic and criteria air pollution
emissions."

However, according to Chapter 3B within the WCWLB CERP, which
represents Wilmington/Carson/West Long Beach, it asserts that,
while Diesel Particulate Matter (DPM) was the main contributor of
higher air toxic cancer risks within the SCAQMD basin, CHC vessels
were not among the top contributors of PM2.5 or VOC. In fact, this
document clearly states that overall NOx emissions are expected to
increase through 2029 due to "industrial and on-road mobile
sources". It also makes note of the fact that the primary
contributors of NOx from the "Off-Road" sector remain Ocean Going
Vessels (OGV's). While it does assert that Off-Road Sources account
for 45% of NOx emissions within the region, nowhere does it make
the claim that CHC vessels are a primary contributor. Concluding
that the CHC fleet is the primary source of air pollution and
higher cancer rates from this CERP is baseless and can only be
rationalized by grouping CHC vessels in with Ocean Going Vessels,
while at the same time dismissing CARB's own projections of the
impact of on road mobile sources. 

3)	Subchapter M operators are bound by strict vessel stability
requirements. If forced to install DPF+SCR aftertreatment systems,
this could put many tugboats out of compliance with 46 CFR 170-173.
The Cal Maritime Feasibility study points out that, in the case of
ship assist tugs, the added equipment will raise the Vertical
Center of Gravity (VCG), thus impacting the vessel's range of
stability. The push to implement Tier 4 engines w/ DPF + SCR
aftertreatment systems also assumes that tugboat designs are
flexible and can accommodate the added equipment without major
modifications to the vessel. This is incorrect, and is even stated
throughout the Cal Maritime Feasibility Study, which "cherry
picked'' specific vessels in each CHC class that were most
compatible with these new engine upgrades. This study asserts that,
while these engine upgrades are technically feasible onboard a very
specific vessel, it would require extensive rerouting of exhaust
systems and a complete rearrangement of the engine room in order to
make space for the aftertreatment equipment such as the DPF tank
and SCR silencers. Considering that a tugboat's major components
are deeply integrated throughout the vessel, making modifications
such as the ones being proposed would be nearly impossible without
having to retrofit the entire ship. Additionally, there are
concerns regarding the impact of the DPF + SCR aftertreatment
systems on the vessel's exhaust system which was not addressed in
the Cal Maritime Feasibility Study. These aftertreatment systems
choke the flow of exhaust creating a backup of pressure which can
lead to engine failure. This highlights a valid safety concern,
rather than a fiscal burden. Attempting to rapidly force
unavailable, infeasible, and untested technology upon this specific
class of vessel will put stability, and ultimately crew safety, in
jeopardy. 

4)	CHC operators are faced with limited options for installing EPA
certified marine engines and aftertreatment systems. Currently,
there are not enough engine manufacturers producing the necessary
ranges of Tier 4 EPA certified engines, or Level 3 DPF
aftertreatment systems for marine use. As of today, the new
proposal will force every CHC operator, covered under this
regulation, to patron a small pool of manufacturers in order to
install equipment that meets their specifications. While this will
certainly benefit the manufacturer(s), it will ultimately cause
extensive delays for CHC operators attempting to comply by getting
this equipment installed. 

5)	The new CHC amendments will ultimately impact tug and barge
companies engaging in the Civil and Other Heavy Duty Engineering
Sector, on two fronts. These Subchapter M operators are frequently
contracted to perform necessary work in the marine space on behalf
of construction firms and federal agencies. Necessary channel
maintenance projects in California are contracted out by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. These projects, especially in California,
require the use of clamshell dredges which are also subject to the
tenets of the new CHC amendments. For tug operators who own and
employ dredge assets this pending regulation will proliferate an
additional layer of regulatory action taken against their fleets. 

6)	There are a limited number of Subchapter M operators capable of
handling the volume and scope of marine construction work along
California's coast. The consequences of these regulations will not
only cause immediate harm to tug companies operating in the
maritime construction industry but will have compounding effects on
those construction firms who contract tug and barge operators as
well. The subsequent industry impacts of these CHC Amendments will
be reflected through higher rates and possible delays of vital
marine construction and management projects. Most notably, this
will impact channel deepening/widening projects which must occur
regularly for our ports to remain open to large container vessels
carrying vital cargo. The few Subchapter M operators who will be
left to perform this work will have a monopoly on this specific
industry sector causing the prices of these large-scale dredging
projects to increase. For construction firms that subcontract CHC
operators for the use of their tugs and barges, rates will increase
as well. 

The new amendment seems to be an unjustified expansion of existing
CHC regulations that is being slipped under the current AB-617
legislation. The insurmountable financial burden and lost
opportunity costs associated with repowering lower tier vessels,
within the fleets of small tug and barge operators, puts them at a
competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, attempting to spur
innovation of cleaner marine technologies by way of harsher
regulations will be counterproductive and will ultimately achieve
an antithetical result. 




For these reasons we ask that CARB: 

-Define its methodology for establishing the population of CHCs
operating over 300 hours in California waters. It is important that
the methodology also accounts for the specific operational usage of
these vessels. 

-Show direct cause between CHC's and higher cancer rates. It is
irresponsible to draw this conclusion without first proving
causation for obvious reasons. Placing the burden of guilt upon CHC
operators, while openly acknowledging that "Industrial & On Road
emission sources will cause NOx levels to increase through 2029",
in a region that is heavily industrialized and situated amongst the
nations most congested freeway systems seems to be a rush to
judgement.

-Enforce compliance dates on a case-by-case basis. CARB's approach
to these CHC regulations applies a "one size fits all" solution for
various types of vessels across vastly different industry sectors.
While the current technology may be feasible for some CHC operators
to implement within their fleets at this time, it does not mean
that other operators in different industry sectors can
automatically do the same. We ask that these compliance dates work
in conjunction with a responsible rollout of this technology, where
the OEM tests and approves these new engine upgrades for each
specific vessel. 

-Re-evaluate its approach of regulation over incentivization. If
the goal is to substantially lower emissions within heavily
impacted, low-income regions then the current incentive structure
must be re-evaluated. Currently, the only applicable public funding
for vessel repowers come via the Carl Moyer, DERA, and VW
Mitigation Trust programs. The ability of these programs to
allocate funds for the purpose of a vessel repower is hindered by
relatively low maximum award limits and grant stacking
restrictions. These programs are inefficient in allocating
sufficient funds for singular marine repower projects, much less
multiple projects within the same fleet. As previously mentioned,
many of these projects will not be simple repowers, but will
involve a complete retrofit of the vessel. If this is the case for
multiple ships within a single fleet, then the costs of integrating
these new engines will be much higher. This means that the current
maximum award limits of these funds will render them almost useless
in helping CHC operators meet these new upgrade requirements.
Restriction of these funds will be further exacerbated upon the
implementation of harsher CHC regulations under AB-617.